"Asif Zardari ki zahanat ko salaam."Meaning, salute to the brilliance of Asif Zardari.
Hard to believe, but it was meant in total and complete earnest. How do I know that? A 'minjanib' (translated: from) postscript was added alongwith the green, red, black colors of the Pakistan's People's Party.
I laughed, of course. Which self-respecting Pakistani wouldn't.
However, as I was to read the following article later, it was foolish of me to do so. That banner had a hell lot of meaning to it. As it turns out, how Mr. Zardari has orchestrated the future of Pakistan. This is a must-read article for anyone who gives a damn.
So writes Karamatullah K. Ghori, and I quote:
A cynic could be pardoned for saying there’s never a dull moment in the ‘land of the pure.’ But the pace of political flux in Pakistan is, simply, much too mind-boggling even for the most jaded of pundits and crystal ball-gazers.Give the credit where it’s due. Asif Zardari has kept to his arcane game of breaking promises like chattels. This 21st century incarnation of Chanakya’s mantra of rajnit ( statecraft) — deceit, deception and duplicity — and Machiavelli’s guiding light of how the prince must take his subjects on a merry-go-round as long as he could, is a new phenomenon, even to the deeply duplicitous feudal culture of Pakistan. So Zardari has kept the whole nation of 165 million people spell-bound and literally on a wild goose chase.
The parting of the ways between Nawaz and Zardari had been on the cards from the moment they sat down together in Murree, or Bhurban, last March to ink the first of nearly half a dozen ‘agreements’ and pledges for the restoration of judges. The house of cards they had assembled had to collapse because the bigger partner never had the intent of following through on its commitment.
Zardari’s reservations on account of some of the judges doomed the agreement even before the ink could dry on it. The PPP supremo, elevated to the pedestal of his party’s kingmaker, didn’t want Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, in particular, to return to the bench of the apex court for a variety of reasons, mostly those focused on his past, present and future.
The burden of steering the coalition to a safe landing from the shoals had all along been on Nawaz, the minor of the two partners. He had taken a moral high ground on the issue of the judiciary’s sanctity from the moment he returned home from years of forced exile. His party won the election in Punjab largely on what it hawked as the moral imperative of restoring the top judiciary to its pre-November 3 position. Even if he wanted to resile from that moral plateau he couldn’t, because that would have doomed his future prospects for good.
The alliance with the PPP was also crucial to the fulfilment of Nawaz Sharif’s other high priority of getting rid of his arch nemesis, Musharraf. He knew that he couldn’t topple Musharraf from his perch without Zardari getting on board the juggernaut to breach his ( Musharraf’s) ramparts. The uneasy relationship, in that sense, was symbiotic, which kept it going for a while.Zardari may not have been as keen as Nawaz, initially, to kick Musharraf out of the presidency. There was a nexus of interests, no doubt, between Musharraf and him on several key issues, the most prominent of which riveted on Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. The vocal and prying judge was a pariah in both their books; for sheer survival, the two of them were on the same page on this key demand of not only Nawaz but of the Pakistani people, en masse, to bring Chaudhry back to where he was on November 3.
But Zardari, in the meantime, had moved ahead of both Nawaz and Musharraf. His Machiavellian horse sense had guided him to make his own incursions into Musharraf’s erstwhile sanctum in Washington, the ultimate equaliser in Pakistan’s political dispensations. His team of court confidants at home, and one tribune positioned in the embassy in Washington, got him the audience that he had been seeking. The power brokers in ‘the capital of the world’ were finally convinced that Musharraf had become a liability and that there was a new asset available to run Pakistan according to their blueprint of priorities. Musharraf’s fate was sealed and delivered.
Musharraf’s glue, which had kept the two unnatural allies orbiting meaninglessly in the same sphere, becoming unstuck ordained the unravelling of the alliance. It didn’t take long to fall apart. There couldn’t be a different denouement than that for the two principal contenders to political power in Pakistan.
Putting the two in the balance, in terms of who gained how much and who lost what, Nawaz may still end up with a better deal, though not in the immediate sense of time. Taking a morally superior position and abiding by principles is not what Machiavelli would approve of. But Nawaz has secured Punjab on his side and the way the chemistry of the federation works — with Punjab being the prime element — it doesn’t need a political scientist’s brilliance and acumen to foresee the future.
Zardari, no doubt, is the prime beneficiary in the immediate sense. He has, in one stroke hit Musharraf’s ball out of the ballpark and got the presidency all but stitched for himself. Could anyone, in their wildest dream, have foreseen this cataclysmic change of fortunes, even a year ago? Could any of the jaded political soothsayers have perceived a man as universally reviled in Pakistan as Zardari in the hot seat of Musharraf?
However, Zardari’s victory carries the risk of proving pyrrhic in the long term, perhaps less for him than to the beguiled nation of mostly mute spectators. The first damage, incalculable at this stage, is almost certain to be caused to the federation’s moorings.
The strange spectacle of the provincial leaderships of the three smaller provinces of the federation — Sindh, the NWFP and Balochistan — handing down ringing endorsements to Zardari as president smacks of three vs. one: Punjab against the rest of the federation. Where would this drawing of the battle lines take Pakistan to? It doesn’t bode well for the health of the federation, if not, exactly, threatening its unity.The second quantum of damage, which can be sniffed even at this early stage of the fray, is the spirit of the constitution of Pakistan, if not its letter, being mauled in the ongoing shenanigans to have Zardari elected as president. It defies common sense that the kingmaker should also double up as the king.
The office of the president, rightly being touted by Zardari’s partisans and apologists as the symbol of federation’s cohesiveness, demands, in spirit again, that whoever succeeds to it must stay away from politics and be non-partisan. Musharraf failed this litmus test, miserably, and so will Zardari. He will not be — none can imagine him as such — another Chaudhry Fazle Ilahi, who dwarfed against Bhutto. He would assert himself in everything, ride roughshod with impunity and flaunt his authority with gusto, especially with a meek and obliging PM like Gilani ready to do all his bidding and kowtowing to his commands without so much as a squeak of demur.
And all those hankering to balance the current power inequality between the president and the parliament could kiss goodbye to 58-2(B) being removed from the constitution. In fact, the way the Nawaz-Zardari entente cordiale is fraying, the spark for a real flare-up between the two parties they respectively lead would, in all probability, come much sooner than expected over this very issue: PML (N) seeking to undo the blighted provision that arms the president with doomsday powers, and the PPP minions resisting this demand in order to keep their man overly empowered. This could be more than a catalyst for confrontation between them.
But while Zardari as president may be fractious and divisive for the nation, the power brokers engineering this deal are happy at their stroke of genius, in their convoluted sense. In Zardari they have found another prince of darkness, a la Musharraf, eager and anxious to be their frontline soldier — albeit in civvies — in the war against terror. That’s what they expect of any and all Pakistani leaders, damn the rest of the nation’s priorities, pressures and concerns.Washington has good reason to feel comfortable with Pakistan under Zardari doing more of the same that Musharraf had been doing, in fact do it with more exuberance and élan. The single minded devotion and commitment of the civilian government, led by the PPP, to the strategy of force in Bajaur, Swat and other flashpoints in Pakistan is ample evidence of the new recruits to the war on terror doing their master’s bidding with flawless commitment.
Any body doubting the shape and contours of the new game of power politics in Pakistan need only read the lead editorials in the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times, both leading exponents of the establishment elite on both sides of the Anglo-American camaraderie of interest, appearing on the same day, August 26. Both the editorials have lambasted Nawaz Sharif for not giving top billing to the terrorist threat and being lackluster about it. Both have expressed satisfaction that he’s not in power and heaved a sigh of relief at his being out of reckoning at the power centre. Need any more clues as to where Zardari is steering his newly- won fiefdom in Pakistan?
Unquote.
4 comments:
I have always used and taken this word 'zahanat' as a positive thing. I still can't imagine zahanat being used for someone like Zardari.
Perhaps, 'ayyari' is more appropriate?
Great article, by the way.
Ayari.. lol. Yeah that's better.
I love K. Ghori's stuff. Very hardhitting.
An Escalation of the War in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Very Bad Policy.
Conservatives and liberals can argue the merits of the surge in Iraq , or the need to deal with terrorism now rather than later (or the genius of Zardari). I want to focus on something else: the impact of the perspective of 1.5 billion Muslims around the world. I’m not implying that it is somehow homogeneous, just relevant; more relevant than my opinion at least.
Taking the war on terror back to Afghanistan (and most likely Pakistan) is bad for a number of reasons: the perspective of the international Muslim community; the fact that a military solution has not worked thus far, so why keep kicking a dead horse (especially when it has the potential to trample you); the delicate balance of power in the immediate theatre and in the broader region; the likely negative reaction of other states; and last but not least, its potential impact on the price and availability of oil.
Pakistan ’s reaction to the Bush Doctrine has been somewhat mixed. Musharraf was caught in the middle between pleasing the U.S. to ensure continued military and economic support, and the preferences of his constituents who resent the U.S. presence there. The region is already very unstable because of this tension between the US applying pressure from the outside and the internal desire of the populace to rid themselves of the unwanted American presence.
We can say the exact same thing about Afghanistan , Karzai is in a very similar position as Musharraf was. In 2006, Karzai had to start rearming the warlords to maintain order. Similarly, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan - a loose group of Waziristani chieftains, closely associated with the Taliban, who now serve as the de facto security force in charge of North and South Waziristan .
If Senator Obama becomes president, and refocuses the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan , the best we can hope for is another five to six years of what we’ve seen in Iraq . But this best-case scenario is very unlikely.
In addition to a multiple-front war, we would be dealing, not with a fallen state as with Iraq , but with two established states. This could possibly work in our favor as long as they continue to remain on our side. But as already mentioned, the tension is high, and there is a very delicate balance keeping Karzai in power. What if Karzai falls to a coup or assassination? And now with Musharraf stepping down, what happens if Musharraf’s successor plays to the popular demands of the people? We could find ourselves fighting the armies of the sovereign states of Afghanistan and Pakistan , in addition to insurgent forces there. If we consider the history of this region, we realize that this is not as far-fetched as it might sound on the face of it.
As we all know, the Taliban was comprised of Sunni Islamists and Pashtun nationalists (mostly from southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan ). The Taliban initially enjoyed support from the U.S. , Pakistan , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates in the early 1980s to fight the Soviets. By 1996, the Taliban had gained control of most of Afghanistan , but its relationship with the U.S. and most of the rest of the world became strained. Most of the international community supported the Taliban’s rival, the Afghan Northern Alliance .
Still, even after the U.S. began to distance itself from the Taliban in late 1997, Pakistan , Saudi Arabia , and the United Arab Emirates continued to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Even after 9/11 when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates officially stopped recognizing the Taliban, Pakistan continued to support it. The Taliban in turn, had tremendous influence in Pakistani politics, especially among lobby groups- as it virtually controlled areas such as the Pashtun Belt ( Southeast Afghanistan , and Northwest Pakistan ) and Pakistan-administered Kashmir .
Going back to the perception of the international Muslim community … When the U.S. demanded that the Taliban turn Bin Laden over, it initially offered to turn Bin Laden over to Pakistan to be tried by an international tribunal operating according to Sharia law. But Pakistan was urged by the U.S. to refuse. Again, prior to the beginning of U.S. air strikes against Afghanistan , the Taliban offered to try Bin Laden according to Islamic law, but the U.S. refused. After the U.S. began air strikes, the Taliban offered to hand Bin Laden over to a neutral state to be tried under Islamic law, but the U.S. again refused. This is important because in the eyes of the greater international community, the war in Afghanistan was justified (at least initially). But in the eyes of the international Muslim community, especially given the Taliban’s offer to turn over Bin Laden, it was an unnecessary war. This, combined with the preemptive war in Iraq , has led many Muslims to equate the war on terror with a war on Islam. Senator Obama’s plan to escalate the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan will only serve to reinforce that impression.
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, an Islamic political party in Pakistan , won elections in two out of four provinces in 2003, and became the third largest political party in the Pakistani parliament – with substantial support from urban areas (not just border regions). This speaks to the tremendous influence Islamic groups enjoy in Pakistan .
This strong influence is fueled by the fact that the Pashtun tribal group is over 40 million strong. The Taliban continues to receive many of its members from this group today. In fact, the Pakistani army suffered humiliating defeat at the hand of these so-called “insurgents.” Finally, in September 2006, Pakistan was forced to officially recognize the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Many saw the Pakistani government’s acknowledgment of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan as not only a military necessity, but also a political one as well – a concession in response to the growing internal pressure on the Musharraf administration from the people of Pakistan who resent the U.S. presence and involvement in the region.
Just consider the many, many public protests against the Pakistani government’s compliance with the United States . For instance, on January 13, 2006 , the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola , Pakistan . Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area.
On October 30, 2006 , the Pakistani military, under pressure from the U.S. , attacked a madrasah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan . Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced the U.S. military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America !” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam. On November 7, 2006a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, without ever offering their condolences to the families of the slaughtered children.
Last year troubles escalated surrounding the Pakistani government’s siege of the Red Mosque where more than 100 people were killed. Even before Musharraf’s soldiers took the Lal Masjid the retaliations began. Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center.
There are countless more examples; too many to mention in detail. Likewise in Afghanistan ; April 30, 2007 for example, when hundreds of Afghans protested US soldiers killing Afghan civilians. Why can’t the powers that be recognize that we’ve been in Afghanistan for nearly seven years, and in Iraq for over five; a military approach is not working. If we must focus the war on terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan , let’s focus on winning the hearts and minds of the beautiful people of these countries, rather than filling their hearts with bitterness and hatred toward us. With their support, we can offer them the financial and technical assistance that they need to rebuild their infrastructure, their agriculture and their economy. With their support, we can offer them the needed resources to rebuild their human capital and start attracting foreign direct investment. But without their support, we cannot possibly have any positive influence in this region at all; our only influence will be that of brute force, bribery of corrupt officials, and outright coercion. It will be a long, hard, costly and bloody endeavor, and the people of these countries will continue to suffer.
Let’s not forget that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. Let’s not also forget that this is a highly Muslim-concentrated area, the Islamic concept of duty to come to the aid of fellow Muslims would no doubt ensure a huge influx of jihadists in this type of a scenario. Why on earth would we want to intentionally provoke a situation that would not only radicalize existing moderates in the region, but could also potentially cause the influx of a concentration of radical jihadists from elsewhere into an already unstable region (that has nuclear weapons no less)? We would be begging for a nuclear proliferation problem.
We like to assume that we would have the upper hand in such a scenario. But we have been in Afghanistan since October of 2001. And we have yet to assume the upper hand. The fight in Afghanistan has the potential to become much more difficult than it already is. Nor would it be unheard of to expect other major powers to back these radical jihadists with economic and military assistance in much the same way that the US backed the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union . Beyond the fact that roughly 1/5 of the world’s population is Muslim (approximately 1.5 billion people- 85% Sunni, 15% Shia, Ibadiyyas, Ahmadis and Druze), we have to remember that Muslims are the majority in 57 states (out of 195). Most of these have Sunni majorities, which gives them added political power.
China has traditionally backed Pakistan . What would China do if the US were to find itself at war with Pakistan ?
India has tremendous economic and security interests in the region. Let’s not forget that while India has been in nearly continual conflict with Pakistan , primarily over the Kashmir issue, it has the second largest Muslim population in the world next to Indonesia . What happens if India were to side with the U.S. in a potential conflict with Pakistan ? It will have a very difficult task justifying that position with its very large Muslim population. A U.S.-Indian alliance could also spark more terrorist attacks in the Kashmir region; it could also create added tension to the already tenuous relationship between India and Iran , which has a long history of support for Pakistan . Or, if radicals gained control of Pakistan ’s nuclear arsenal, a nuclear attack against India could spark a nuclear altercation between the two nuclear powers. Or, what if radicals then gained control of India ’s nuclear arsenal?
On the other hand, what happens if India for some reason (either via a coup or due to Muslims gaining the upper hand in the long-running Hindu-Muslim conflict) were to side with Pakistan against the United States ? It seems unlikely now, but not completely unrealistic considering the on-again, off-again relationship between the U.S. and every country in that region. We constantly flip-flop in our foreign policy. An attack on Pakistani soil would be a perfect example of this type of wishy-washy foreign policy, as the Bush administration guaranteed Musharraf that the U.S. would never do such a thing (as much as Karzai wants us to). Speaking of Karzai, what if he is ousted and we find ourselves at war with Afghanistan . What would India do then, given its friendship with Afghanistan ?
Also consider the U.S. position on Kashmir , which has a predominantly Muslim population. Pakistan wants a plebiscite, as called for in a 1949 UN resolution, to essentially allow the people to decide which state the region should belong to. India refuses a plebiscite, claiming Kashmir and Jammu as an integral part of India . The U.S. is arming both sides through billions in aid to Pakistan and selective proliferation to India , but insists Pakistan stem terrorist activities flowing from inside its borders, and at the same time discourages India from attacking Pakistan . Yet an escalation of war in the area could backfire badly.
Beyond all that we still have to consider a slew of other states such as Saudi Arabia , Iran , and Russia – not to mention the central Asian states - all of which have economic and/or political and security interests in the region. How will they react to an escalation of the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan ?
Finally, what would such a scenario do to oil prices and availability? I’m 100% in favor of America developing alternative energy sources, but again that’s my opinion, and the oil conglomerates have not been listening to me. Unfortunately, the facts are that the oil lobby is a very powerful entity. Even more to the point, our country could not ween itself off of oil overnight, even if it wanted to. We have to consider what such an escalation would do to oil prices, and the overall availability of oil.
The oil embargo of 1974 (in support of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur war against Israel ), in retaliation against the U.S. for its support of Israel had devastating economic and political consequences on the U.S. and much of Europe . Also, the more recent boycott of Danish products across the Muslim world, in retaliation for the 2005 cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, demonstrates the ability of the international Muslim community to act collectively.
Escalating the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan would also demonstrate the fickle and hypocritical nature of America ’s foreign policy. We supported the Taliban when it served our interests (to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan ) in spite of clear human rights abuses. But now we condemn the Taliban (and much of the Muslim world) over the very same human rights abuses (against women … etc.), while we also continue to ignore similar or same human rights abuses in China, Saudi Arabia, Israel … etc., when it’s convenient for us to do so. We did the same thing with Saddam Hussein; arming him in spite of clear and egregious human rights abuses when he was our ally, and condemning the same actions when he wasn’t.
The U.S. practices selective proliferation with India , and selective sovereignty with those it chooses (today Pakistan , tomorrow someone other than Pakistan ), while at the same time violating the sovereignty of other states- depending on its whim at the time.
The United States government insisted that the Taliban turn over Bin Laden, but the United States itself has refused on several occasions to return foreign nationals (being held on death row in America) to their state of domicile because the U.S. wanted them to face execution, and the home state did not uphold the death penalty. We also continue to refuse to acknowledge the ICC because we don’t want American military personnel tried in an international court. How is that so different from the Taliban wanting Bin Laden tried in an Islamic court?
Rather than blindly accepting that America holds some God-given moral superiority over the rest of the planet, we need to realize that everywhere, humanity has a God-given right to live, love and prosper. Our children have the right to grow up in an environment free of air strikes and constant assault from an external enemy. They have the right to attend schools without fear of being maimed and killed inside of them. And they have the right to be children, instead of orphans. No state has the right to take that away from your children, or from mine. Imagine now that Senator Obama is planning to escalate the war on terror where you live.
I think if we try and stop being puppets to popular propaganda we would see things in a very different light. You eat what you are fed... unfortunately.
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